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OIL, GAS, AND MINERALS
by
Eric T. Laity*
HIS Article surveys the significant developments of the past year in
the Texas law of oil, gas, and minerals.' The scope of this Article is
limited to decisions by Texas and federal courts and to the rules and
regulations promulgated by Texas administrative agencies. The Texas Leg-
islature enacted no measures dealing with oil, gas, or minerals during the
survey period.
I. CASE LAW
A. Surface Deposits of Minerals
The Texas Supreme Court issued a new opinion in Moser v. United States
Steel Corp. 2 that differs in two respects from the previous Moser opinion,3
which the court withdrew. First, the court held that the substances of iron,
lignite, and other forms of coal will not be subject to the Moser test;4 these
substances will continue to be subject to the analysis developed in the Reed
v. Wylie 5 line of cases.6 Second, the Moser test for ownership of substances
not specifically conveyed or reserved by name should be applied only pro-
spectively from the date of the supreme court's original Moser opinion, June
8, 1983. 7 Questions of title stemming from transactions prior to that date
* A.B., J.D., Harvard University. Attorney at Law, Kilgore & Kilgore, Dallas, Texas.
1. The law of oil, gas, and minerals historically has focused on the exploration for and
production of minerals and hydrocarbons. By tradition, the law of oil, gas, and minerals has
not included the legal aspects of the transportation, refining, and marketing of minerals and
hydrocarbons. Neither have the organization and financing of the enterprises conducting these
various activities been considered to be within the ambit of oil, gas, and mineral law. This
Article preserves the traditional focus on the activities of exploration and production.
2. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984). For the facts of this case and a discussion of the supreme
court's first opinion, most of which was repeated in the supreme court's new opinion, see Laity,
Oil, Gas, and Minerals, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 195, 198-200 (1984).
3. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427 (June 8, 1983).
4. 676 S.W.2d at 102. Under the Moser test a severance of minerals clause includes the
severance of any substances within the legal definition of the word "minerals," regardless of
the depth below the surface at which the substances are found. Id.
5. 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). Under the Reed analysis determination of title is based
on whether any reasonable method of removal of a substance near the surface would consume,
deplete, or destroy the surface. Id. at 747. For a discussion of the Reed decision, see Diem &
Laity, Mineral Resources, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 177, 177-79 (1981).
6. 676 S.W.2d at 102. This result follows from the supreme court's addition of Reed v.
Wylie to a list of cited cases dealing with substances that are not part of the mineral estate.
7. Id. at 103.
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will be decided under the Reed line of cases. 8
B. Executive Right to Lease
The Texas Supreme Court also issued a new opinion in Manges v. Guerra.9
The court recharacterized Manges's breach of the standard of care incum-
bent on the holder of the executive right as the breach of a duty arising from
the relationship of the parties.' 0 The supreme court previously had charac-
terized the executive's standard of care as one arising from contract.'I The
court's characterization of the standard of care as one arising from the rela-
tionship of the parties enabled the court to award exemplary damages for the
breach of the executive's duty of utmost fair dealing 12 and to cancel the oil
and gas lease that the executive had negotiated in violation of his duty to the
nonexecutive mineral interest owners.' 3 The court again refused to cancel
the defendant's executive right, but this time the court's refusal was due to
the plaintiffs' election in their motion for judgment to affirm their convey-
ance of the executive right to the defendant in order to seek damages.' 4 The
court previously denied cancellation of the executive right on the ground
that the breach of the executive duty was a breach of an implied covenant,
which usually does not support the remedy of cancellation.'
C. Construction of Mineral Deeds
In Alford v. Krum' 6 the Texas Supreme Court held that the granting
clause of a deed prevails over all other conflicting clauses. ' 7 The court found
an irreconcilable conflict between the granting clause of a mineral deed,
which conveyed one-half of a one-eighth interest, 18 and the deed's future
lease clause, which provided that in the event of a cancellation of the existing
lease all future rentals would be owned jointly by the grantor and grantee,
8. Id.
9. 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).
10. Id. at 183.
11. Manges v. Guerra, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 430 (June 8, 1983) (withdrawn opinion of the
Texas Supreme Court). In several instances in the new opinion the supreme court referred to
the executive's duty as that of a fiduciary, although the court was clear in stating that the
executive's duty is one of utmost good faith and, therefore, subject to a standard lower than
that of a strict fiduciary. See 673 S.W.2d at 183-85 (references to fiduciary duty); cf id. at 183
(duty of utmost good faith); Kimsey v. Fore, 593 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1980, writ re'd n.r.e) (duty owed is one of utmost good faith). Kimsey v. Fore is discussed in
Diem & Laity, supra note 5, at 180-82. The supreme court in effect repudiated Kimsey's analy-
sis of the executive's duty as one arising from an implied covenant, without disturbing Kim-
sey's analysis of the standard of care to be observed by the executive. For the court's analysis
in Kimsey, see 593 S.W.2d at 111-12.
12. 673 S.W.2d at 184-85. Exemplary damages are not available in a suit for breach of
contract. Id. at 184 (citing Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 510 (Tex.
1980)).
13. 673 S.W.2d at 184.
14. Id.
15. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 433.
16. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984).
17. Id. at 872.
18. Id. at 871.
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with each owning a one-half interest. 19 The court held that the grantor had
conveyed only a one-sixteenth interest in the mineral estate in question 20 and
that the interest was not enlarged upon the termination of the lease encum-
bering the estate at the time of the conveyance. 21
The three dissenting judges took the plausible position that the interest
conveyed was one-sixteenth of the mineral estate only during the term of the
lease existing at the time of conveyance. 22 Once that lease expired, the dis-
senting justices concluded, the interest conveyed increased to one-half of the
mineral estate. 23 The dissenting justices found no irreconcilable conflict be-
tween the granting clause and the future lease clause of the mineral deed. 24
Grantors who wish to convey mineral interests dependent in magnitude on
the reversion of the mineral estate will now have to draft the clauses more
clearly than before, since the holding in Alford v. Krum weights deed inter-
pretation in favor of finding superfluous future leasing clauses.
D. Continuous Operations Clauses and Shut-In Royalties
In Mayers v. Sanchez-O'Brien Minerals Corp.25 the San Antonio court of
appeals determined that production from a previously shut-in gas well that
occurs prior to the end of the continuous operations period specified in the
controlling lease will hold the lease in force despite a failure by the lessee to
pay shut-in royalties on time.26 The Mayers' leases included a sixty-day con-
tinuous operations clause. The lessees drilled a single well capable of pro-
ducing gas in commercial quantities. With no market for the well's
production, the lessees shut in the well after its completion and paid shut-in
royalties for a time to the lessors. The landowners believed that the lessees
had missed the anniversary date for the payment of shut-in royalties and
sought a declaration that the leases had terminated. After the anniversary
date alleged by the landowners but before sixty days had run, the lessees
connected the shut-in well to a pipeline and began production. Although the
lessees successfully argued that the landowners incorrectly calculated the an-
niversary date for the payment of shut-in royalties, 27 they also contended
that the continuous operations clause extended the leases to the time that
actual production was achieved. The continuous operations clause by its
19. Id. at 872.
20. Id. at 874. The supreme court noted that the outcome of the case might have been
different if reformation of the deed had been sought. Id. at 873.
21. Id. at 873.
22. Id. at 874 (Pope, C.J., dissenting).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 875.
25. 670 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
26. Id. at 709.
27. The date the first shut-in royalty was paid to the landowners did not correspond with
the beginning of the period indicated on the shut-in royalty receipt as the period for which the
shut-in royalty was being paid. The court of appeals held that the beginning date specified on
the receipt, rather than the lessee's date of payment, was the anniversary date for the payment
of successive shut-in royalties, even though the lease provided that the anniversary date would
be the date on which the shut-in royalty was paid. The shut-in royalty payment refused by the
lessors was, therefore, timely tendered. See id. at 708.
1985]
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terms came into effect if production ceased after having begun. The lessees
claimed that the payment of shut-in royalties amounted to constructive pro-
duction from the leases. Failure to pay shut-in royalties on the relevant an-
niversary date, the lessees argued, constituted a cessation of production,
which in turn brought into play the sixty-day period under the continuous
operations clause. The court of appeals agreed with the lessees. 28
Although the court of appeals was willing to view the payment of shut-in
royalties as constructive production for purposes of invoking the continuous
operations clause, the court indicated that it would not view the renewed
payment of shut-in royalties as constructive production for purposes of com-
plying with the sixty-day deadline for the restoration of production. 29 Ac-
tual production, rather than constructive production, is necessary for the
lease to be held beyond the continuous operations period. 30 The court of
appeals stated that "once a lease is held by the payment of shut-in royalties,
the cessation of production clause does not provide a grace period for the
late payment of subsequent shut-in payments." 3'
E. Constructive Trusts
In Ginther v. Taub32 the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of
a constructive trust on an oil and gas lease held of record by the knowing
beneficiary of another's fraud. 33 The grantee's attorney fraudulently in-
duced the plaintiffs to convey their undivided fifty-percent interest in an oil
and gas lease. At the time of the conveyance the plaintiffs believed that the
grantee would reassign their interest in the lease when the plaintiffs reim-
bursed the grantee for delay rentals already paid by the grantee. The attor-
ney who fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to convey their interest in the
lease had represented the plaintiffs in prior business transactions and was
found to have breached his fiduciary relationship with the plaintiffs.34
Although the jury determined that the grantee knowingly participated in the
fraud, the supreme court's opinion indicated that a constructive trust could
have been imposed even upon a totally innocent beneficiary. 35 The imposi-
tion of a constructive trust on a knowing or unknowing beneficiary of fraud,
even though the beneficiary is not the actual wrongdoer, is a valid exception
to the general rule that title to real property interests cannot rest in parol.36
28. Id. at 709.
29. Id. at 711.
30. Id. Drawing a distinction between actual production and constructive production for
purposes of complying with the deadline for renewed production provided a means by which
the court of appeals could distinguish the Mayers case from a troublesome case cited by the
lessors: Steeple Oil & Gas Corp. v. Amend, 337 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ App.-Amarillo 1960,
writ re'd n.r.e.) (payment of shut-in royalties did not constitute constructive production, and,
therefore, the cessation of shut-in royalties could not trigger the continuous operations clause).
31. 670 S.W.2d at 711.
32. 675 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. 1984).
33. Id. at 728.
34. Id. at 727.
35. Id. at 728.
36. Id.
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F Implied Covenants
In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Exxon Corp. 37 the Texas Supreme Court re-
jected an attempt by the court of appeals to infer an implied covenant from a
casinghead gasoline plant contract. Atlantic Richfield and others had en-
tered into a contract more than thirty years ago with Exxon and another
company, by which Atlantic Richfield and the others gained their undivided
interests in the plant.38 The owners of the plant intended to use it to process
casinghead gas produced from a nearby oil field. A separate agreement pro-
vided that the products of the processed casinghead gas would be shared
among the owners of the plant in proportion to their respective interests in
the field, rather than in proportion to the plant owners' interests in the un-
processed casinghead gas actually delivered to the plant from that field. In
addition, the agreement provided that a two-thirds majority vote would be
necessary to terminate the plant agreement. Suitable provisions were in-
cluded in the agreement to guard against situations in which a single party to
the agreement would have the requisite two-thirds interest to terminate the
agreement or the requisite one-third interest to veto any proposed termina-
tion of the agreement. Atlantic Richfield began producing casinghead gas
from the nearby field at a greater proportionate rate than the other plant
owners, with the result that the other owners gained more in finished prod-
ucts from the plant than the unprocessed casinghead gas that they were de-
livering to the plant. When Atlantic Richfield's production slowed to a rate
less than its proportionate ownership of the field compared to the production
of the other plant owners, all parties to the plant agreement other than At-
lantic Richfield voted to terminate the agreement. The other plant owners
substituted a virtually identical agreement that provided that the ownership
of processed products would be divided in proportion to the unprocessed
casinghead gas actually delivered to the plant. Atlantic Richfield was thus
unable to recoup the benefit that it had conferred upon the other plant own-
ers by its early heavy field production. Atlantic Richfield sued to have the
termination of the first plant agreement set aside and the successor agree-
ment declared void.
One of the arguments sustained by the court of appeals but ultimately
rejected by the supreme court examined a clause in the agreement that
barred changes in ownership interests in the nearby field from affecting the
ownership of the plant and the processed products. Atlantic Richfield ar-
gued that this clause showed the parties' intent that each party eventually
would receive as processed products its original share of the field's reserves.
As a result, Atlantic Richfield argued, the clause imposed upon the agree-
ment's termination provision an implied covenant not to exercise the termi-
37. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 68 (Nov. 3, 1984).
38. The reader is advised to read the opinion of the supreme court in conjunction with the
opinion of the court of appeals for a statement of the facts of this case. The court of appeals'
opinion appears at 663 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd in part and arf'd




nation provision in such a way as to thwart the intent of that clause. The
court of appeals agreed with Atlantic Richfield's contention that an implied
covenant limited the termination provision and concluded that the consent
of all the parties would be required to modify the ownership interests in the
processed products. 39 The court of appeals also sustained Atlantic Rich-
field's argument that a party was under a legal duty not to exercise a cancel-
lation provision unjustly to the injury of another party to the contract.4g
The Texas Supreme Court refused to recognize either argument and af-
firmed the trial court's judgment denying all relief to Atlantic Richfield. 4 1
The court summarily rejected both arguments. The supreme court stated
that no implied covenant regarding termination arises when a specific provi-
sion about termination has been included in the parties' contract. 42 The
supreme court determined that the parties' termination provision could not
be varied by a perceived duty not to exercise the provision unjustly to the
injury of another party; the court considered such a perceived duty as a
variation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that the
court had declined to recognize in an earlier session.4 3 The court's decision
emphasized the necessity for a party to an agreement to think through, prior
to signing the agreement, the possible courses that its relationship with the
other parties might take in the future.
G. Lease Repudiation
In NRG Exploration, Inc. v. Rauch44 the Austin court of appeals held that
operations on pooled acreage under a lease would not prevent the lessee
from taking advantage of the doctrine of repudiation with regard to the un-
pooled acreage. 45 The doctrine of repudiation tolls the time period provided
under the habendum clause of an oil and gas lease for the fulfillment of the
lessee's obligations for as long as the lessor contests the validity of the
lease.46 The doctrine is not available, however, to lessees who continue to
perform their obligations during the period of repudiation.47
The Rauch lease provided for a primary term of five years. At the end of
the primary term the lease would remain in effect for an additional two years
as to unpooled acreage if various conditions had been met. Although these
various conditions were met by the Rauches' lessee, the Rauches filed suit
shortly after the two-year supplemental period began, seeking cancellation of
the entire lease. Two years after the suit was filed, the Rauches gave a sec-
ond lease covering most of the acreage to another lessee and took a volun-
39. 663 S.W.2d at 870.
40. Id. (citing C.S. Martin & Son v. John Bonara & Co., 214 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ
App.-Texarkana 1919, writ dism'd)).
41. 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 70.
42. Id.
43. Id. The supreme court had declined to recognize an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in English v. Fisher, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
44. 671 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e).
45. Id. at 652.
46. See id.; 3 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 604.7 (1984).
47. 671 S.W.2d at 652.
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tary nonsuit in their cause against their first lessee. Shortly after the
Rauches ended their litigation, NRG Exploration brought suit seeking a
declaration that the first lease was still effective. In support of its position,
NRG Exploration contended that the Rauches' litigation in effect repudiated
the first lease, and, therefore, the running of the two-year supplemental pe-
riod was suspended during the time of the Rauch litigation. The Rauches
countered that the lessee must cease operations on the leased acreage if the
running of the two-year supplemental period was to be tolled. Since the
lessee had drilled a well during the two-year supplemental period on a unit
that included part of the Rauch acreage, the lessors argued that the doctrine
of repudiation did not apply. The court of appeals disagreed with the
Rauches and held that operations by a lessee on a unit formed prior to the
repudiating lawsuit would not prevent the lessee from relying on the doc-
trine of repudiation with regard to the remainder of the leased acreage a.4
Production from the pooled acreage, the court of appeals noted, would not
extend the term of the lease as to unpooled acreage. 49
H. Forced Pooling Statute
The Texas Supreme Court examined the Texas forced pooling statute in
Carson v. Railroad Commission of Texas.50 The Carsons owned a royalty
interest in a tract of land within a proration unit and their lessee, BTA Oil
Producers, drilled a producing well on the Carson tract.5 ' The Carson lease
gave the lessee no authority to pool the Carson acreage. After the well had
been completed as a producer, BTA Oil Producers approached the Carsons,
seeking their consent to a voluntary pooling agreement. Under the terms of
the proposed agreement the Carsons would have shared their royalty income
with the owners of royalty interests in adjacent lands from which no produc-
tion had been obtained, reducing the Carsons' royalty income by two-thirds.
The Carsons refused to agree to the voluntary pooling agreement proposed
by their lessee. BTA Oil Producers then applied to the Texas Railroad Com-
mission for a forced pooling order, which was granted.
On appeal to the supreme court the proceedings centered on whether the
voluntary pooling arrangement proposed by BTA Oil Producers to the Car-
sons had been fair and reasonable, as the forced pooling statute requires.5 2
The court made two significant points about the fair and reasonable test used
by the statute. First, the court noted that the test affected the jurisdiction of
the railroad commission to consider an application for forced pooling.5 3 If
no fair and reasonable offer for voluntary pooling has been made, then the
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 669 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 1984). The Texas forced pooling statute is cited as the Mineral
Interest Pooling Act and appears at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-.018 (Vernon
1978).
51, The facts of this case have been simplified for this discussion.
52. TEX. NAT. Rrts. CODE ANN. § 102.013(b) (Vernon 1978).
53. 669 S.W.2d at 316.
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railroad commission must dismiss the application. 54 Any judicial review of
the railroad commission's determination of a fair and reasonable offer is not
limited to a review of the administrative proceedings for substantial evidence
in support of the agency's determination, but instead is a jurisdictional re-
view giving the reviewing court greater latitude in scrutinizing the agency's
determination. 5 5 Second, the court pointed out that the criterion of deemed
fairness and reasonableness given by section 102.013(c) 56 did not apply in
this type of case, in which a person is resisting being forced into a pool. 57
The court stated that the deemed fairness criterion may be used only by a
person seeking to join an existing pool on his own motion.58
The supreme court decided as a matter of law that the voluntary pooling
proposal made by BTA Oil Producers had not been fair and reasonable and
instructed the railroad commission to dismiss BTA Oil Producers' applica-
tion for want of jurisdiction. 59 The court apparently was persuaded by three
factors in arriving at its decision. First, the court objected to the timing of
the offer made to the Carsons; 6° had the offer been made before the Carson
well had been drilled, the Carsons would have had reason to accept the offer
not knowing whether their acreage would be productive. 61 Second, BTA Oil
Producers had refused to negotiate with the Carsons after the Carsons had
rejected its offer.62 Third, the court apparently objected to the high-handed
manner in which BTA Oil Producers had made the original offer for volun-
tary pooling; BTA Oil Producers' original correspondence with the Carsons
suggested that the Carsons were required to accept the offer for voluntary
pooling.63
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Texas Railroad Commission adopted four sets of rules during the sur-
vey period that affect the oil, gas, and minerals area. First, the Commission
promulgated rules governing the contents of an application for a qualified
subdivision."4 During the previous survey period, the Texas Legislature
amended the Natural Resources Code to provide a means by which surface
owners might restrict the mineral use of suburban subdivisions. 65 Surface
owners may now apply to the Railroad Commission for approval of a plat
that designates operations sites and appropriate easements. 66 Owners of pos-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.013(c) (Vernon 1978).
57. 669 S.W.2d at 316.
58. Id. at 317. The supreme court determined that the Texas Legislature intended
§ 102.013(c) to be a means by which a small acreage owner could force his way into a larger.
established proration unit by offering only to share in the royalties on an acreage basis. Id.





64. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 9 Tex. Reg. 75 (1984) (adopting 16 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.74).
65. See Laity, supra note 2, at 205, 206.
66. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 9 Tex. Reg. 75 (1984).
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sessory mineral interests within such a qualified subdivision will be required
to use only the surface in designated operations sites and easements for their
surface operations within the subdivision. 67
Second, the Commission adopted amendments to rules that protect water
quality. 68 These amendments specify standards and set forth procedures for
gaining permits for pits used to store oil field drilling fluids or to dispose of
oil and gas wastes. 69 Third, the Commission simplified its determination
procedures under the Natural Gas Policy Act.70 This simplification was
made after the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission adopted a number of
orders that eliminated the need for a separate alternate filing program for
Texas operators. 71 Fourth, the Commission amended the definition of a
marginal well to conform the definition to a statutory change made in
1983.72
67. Id.
68. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 9 Tex. Reg. 1549 (1984) (amending 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.8).
69. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 9 Tex. Reg. at 1549.
70. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 9 Tex. Reg. 1788 (1984), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 2866 (1984)
(amending 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.103); see Natural Gas Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7255
(1976).
71. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 9 Tex. Reg. 1788 (1984).
72. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 9 Tex. Reg. 5 (1984), adopted, 9 Tex. Reg. 3728 (1984) (amending
16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.69).
1985]

